[T]he principle underlying the Court's opinion is that one who is accorded equal treatment under the laws, but cannot as readily as others obtain preferential treatment under the laws, has been denied equal protection of the laws. If merely stating this alleged "equal protection" violation does not suffice to refute it, our constitutional jurisprudence has achieved terminal silliness.
trine.9 But surely if Denver, Aspen, and Boulder do enact ordinances treating sexual orientation like race for antidiscrimination purposes, these cities are not forever barred from later repealing these ordinances. Repeal here is a kind of state action, but not an unconstitutional kind. The Constitution does not require that "special" antidiscrimination rights, once extended, irrevocably vest via some magic and antidemocratic one-way ratchet. And if Denver, Aspen, and Boulder can repeal these ordinances, presumably the Colorado legislature can repeal them by statute; and so too the people of Colorado can repeal them by state constitutional amendment (via initiative or referendum). To think otherwise is terminally silly.10
To be sure, Colorado's Amendment 2 "entrenches" its No Strict Scrutiny For Sexual Orientation Discrimination Rule in the sense that opponents of the stingy rule can now prevail only by passing a new constitutional amendment rather than a local ordinance or a state statute. Passing a new constitutional amendment is of course an onerous task. But all constitutional provisions entrench in this sense. The Strict Scrutiny For Race Discrimination Rule in the Fourteenth Amendment, as construed by the Supreme Court, itself entrenches in just this way. Opponents of this federal rule can now prevail only by passing a new federal constitutional amendment (rather than a state law or congressional statute). And, of course, it is notoriously tough to pass a new federal constitutional amendment. But surely that entrenchment does not make the Fourteenth Amendment itself unconstitutional. To think it does would be terminally silly.
The Denver, Aspen, and Boulder ordinances repealed by Amendment 2, however, did more than prohibit government from discriminating on the basis of orientation. The ordinances also prohibited certain forms of private discrimination -in employment and in housing, for example. But surely the cities were not constitutionally obliged to pass these private discrimination codes. The federal Constitution generally does not require that the government prohibit private discrimination. If it did, the "state action" requirement of the Equal Protection Clausewhich bans government discrimination but not private discrimination had the purpose and effect of stigmatizing blacks -not for what they did, but for who they were. And that, plaintiffs argued, was a kind of attainder, a legislatively imposed stain and taint. 17 To see this more clearly, and to see the implications for Romer, let us proceed through a series of hypotheticals.
Hypothetical One. "The Anti-Amar Law. Akhil Reed Amar shall be drawn, hanged, and quartered. His private parts shall be cut off, his blood shall be deemed corrupted, and his children shall be stripped of their inheritance from him." This is a textbook attainder, historically speaking.'8 A court may impose a death sentence on a named individual, but a legislature may not. And so this law is obviously unconstitutional.
In part, the nonattainder rule is rooted in narrow ideas of adjudicative due process. Before a person is made to suffer a criminal sanction, he must have his day in court, with individual notice of the charges, an opportunity to be heard in his own defense, the assistance of counsel, the chance to confront opposing witnesses in a proceeding governed by proper rules of evidence and relevance, and so forth. My Hypothetical, though graphic, accurately represents the obvious fixation on the body and the private parts -the insides -of the real-life attainder victim. The typical, highly ritualized sentence of one attainted of treason in England was as follows:
You are to be drawn upon a hurdle to the place of execution, and there you are to be hanged by the neck, and being alive cut down, and your privy-members to be cut off, and your bowels to be taken out of your belly and there burned, you being alive; and your head to be cut off, and your body to be divided into four quarters, and that your head and quarters be disposed of where his majesty shall think fit. But the nonattainder rule goes much deeper, tapping into basic principles of separation of powers and equal protection. Even if Congress were willing to give me a hearing before attainting me, the Constitution bars it from acting as a court (outside the strictly circumscribed impeachment process). In general, the legislature must prescribe penalties generally and prospectively, behind a suitably impersonal veil of ignorance: "All persons who do X in the future shall be hanged." Those who seek to avoid the noose are thus given fair warning that they must refrain from conduct X. Without the nonattainder principle, the legislature could simply single out its enemies -or the politically unpopular -and condemn them for who they are, or for what they have done in the past and can no longer change. Here we see an obvious link between the nonattainder rule and the related ban on ex post facto laws. Indeed, in both Article I, Section 9, limiting Congress, and Article I, Section 10, limiting states, the Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses stand side-by-side. A court independent of the legislature may condemn a named person for what he has done in the past; courts operate retrospectively and specifically in discrete cases and controversies: United States v. Amar. But a court must treat like cases alike and may apply only the general criminal norms previously laid down by statute or custom, rather than whatever criminal rules the judges might prefer were they legislators. By separating the process of penal lawmaking and penal adjudication, the Constitution protects both liberty and equality and promotes the rule of law; the legislature can only prescribe new penal rules for all, and the judiciary can only apply pre-existing penal laws against named individuals.21 Both legislation and adjudication must be suitably impersonal. Neither legislators nor judges can punish me simply because they do not like me.
Suppose, however, that the legislature does not itself purport to adjudicate guilt and impose a criminal sentence as a court, but instead ment without a judicial trial ....
[ passes a clever variant of the Anti-Amar Law: "It shall henceforth (prospectively) be a (general) crime for anyone to be Akhil Reed Amar, to have his blood type, feelings, fingerprints, and DNA. The courts shall apply this (general) law and accord any defendant the traditional procedural rights of notice, opportunity to be heard, counsel, confrontation, and so forth. Anyone found guilty of this (general) crime in court shall be drawn, hanged, quartered, etc." Obviously, this too is a textbook bill of attainder even though it purports to leave "adjudication" of the "crime" to independent courts. It is an attainder because, despite its dishonest protestations, it fails the requisite test of generality and prospectivity. It makes it a capital crime to be who I am. 23. My claim here is not that every attainder must be a law that makes it a crime to be who I am, but that every such law must be an attainder. Later, I shall generalize the principle by suggesting that -whatever else it might also ban -the Attainder Clause frowns on all penal laws based on status or identity.
The Attainder Clause implicates at least five basic constitutional ideals, not all of which are present in every attainder case. First, as we have seen, the Clause implicates rights of individualized adjudicatory process -due process rights of notice and the opportunity to be heard. Second, the Clause affirms separation of powers and rule of law notions of generality, prospectivity, transparency, and impersonality. Third, the Clause anticipates the equal protection idea banning stigmatic penalties imposed on an unpopular person or group based on status, especially when laws reflect revulsion toward impure, corrupt, or degraded bodies or body parts. Fourth, the Clause, when read in light of its history, calls for special sensitivity and judicial skepticism when a legislature singles out political agitators or opposition speakers for disfavored treatment. See Note how, by merely "targeting" certain individuals, the government can often count on private citizens to pull the trigger. Thus, in 1794 James Madison objected to a congressional resolution that did no more than declare that certain specified persons were involved in an insurrection: "It is in vain to say that this indiscriminate censure is no punishment. If it falls on classes, or individuals, it will be a severe pun- but the true social meaning of these laws was apparent to honest observers in 1954, if not in 1896.42 And the key question about segregation -is it really equal, or does it create two classes, one superior and one inferior? -is roughly the same whether we employ the nonattainder principle or the equal protection principle.
It might be thought that this argument proves too much. Under this account of the true spirit of the nonattainder principle, wasn't slavery unconstitutional from the outset? For surely punishing a person -by effective life imprisonment -merely because he was born to a slave mother seems an obvious status-based punishment. Yet surely slavery was constitutional in 1789, wasn't it?
There are two responses here. The first, technical response is to distinguish between slaves and all free persons, including free blacks. Slaves were by definition deemed outside the constitutional compactbeyond the Constitution's protections. Constitutionally speaking, they were akin to outlaws who indeed could be treated as wild beasts. But as Justice Curtis proved decisively in his Dred Scott dissent,43 free blacks were, from the Founding on, very much part of "We the People." They were citizens in free states where at times they voted, served in militias, held offices of honor, and so on.
The second, more candid response is that slavery was inconsistent with the spirit of the Attainder Clause -and with the spirit of many other provisions too, from due process of law to republican government. But these principles were implicitly limited by the Constitution's tacit approval of slavery in other clauses: the reference to "other" persons in the Article I Apportionment Clause, the Article IV Fugitive Slave Clause, and so on.44 In the long run, Americans could not live with these contradictory premises -with a country and Constitution halfslave and half-free. And so after the Civil War, the Constitution worked itself pure with amendments that abolished slavery and reconfirmed the truest meaning of the freedom principles embodied in the Attainder, Due Process, Republican Government, and other Clauses.
What about women? From the Founding on, they too were subject to status-based, legislatively imposed disabilities of all sorts -legal ineligibility to act as lawyers, for example. Why didn't these disabilities violate the nonattainder principle? The nonanachronistic answer is that 47. It might be argued that these two Hypotheticals are different because a person cannot easily hide the fact that she is Indian American, but she can hide the fact that she is queer. But this argument flies in the face of Cummings, Garland, and Brown. Whether a person is a former Confederate or Communist sympathizer is not etched on his face. Ex-rebs, ex-Commies, and queers can all try to "pass." Indeed, the very ability to hide one's heart or one's past can create a special measure of social anxiety about the hidden "enemy within" -a fifth column of body-snatching pod people who could be anywhere, even next door. See also supra note 37 (discussing English attainders by description in situations where attainder targets might be able to "pass").
The ability of gays to "pass" and "hide" suggests that they are not quite like blacks, who help define the paradigm case for Equal Protection Clause analysis. Cf. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion) (stressing "the high visibility of the sex characteristic" to justify heightened equal protection scrutiny of sex discrimination). But under the Attainder Clause, the paradigm cases in the Supreme Court have indeed involved groups that can "pass" and "hide. There is an obvious analogy between unorthodox religious and political thoughts that outraged the Establishment 250 years ago and heretical sexual fantasies that outrage the Orthodox today -"compassing" the death of traditional sex roles and the Heterosexual Order.
Hypothetical Eight. "The Queer Discrimination Amendment. No person of homosexual or bisexual orientation shall be eligible to secure a local ordinance or state law prohibiting public or private discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation." For our purposes, this law is really no different from Hypothetical Seven. In both cases, queers are declared ineligible for things that everyone else is eligible for. The only difference is the form of ineligibility. In Hypothetical Seven it was public and private employment, and here it is legislation prohibiting public and private discrimination.
There may be no substantive constitutional right either to certain jobs or to certain anti-discrimination laws; but there is an equality right to get the same benefits that one's fellow citizens can get. Under the nonattainder principle, there is a right not to be singled out by name in a law that, metaphorically speaking, paints one's private parts red.55
Attainders . 1994) . In Walmer and Richenberg, the courts rejected Attainder Clause claims. In Meinhold, the court issued a preliminary injunction against the U.S. Navy on the ground that mandatory discharge of gay service members on the basis of their "sexual status" violated the Attainder Clause. In subsequent proceedings, however, the Attainder Clause claim apparently dropped out of the case. Of course, my claim here is not that the Clause is some magic bullet that will always win for gays, but that it is, in some cases, an especially apt tool. 59. Amendment 2 was adopted by popular referendum, but this legislative action should be treated no differently from other legislative action under the Attainder Clause -or its companion, the Ex Post Facto Clause, for that matter. See TRIBE, supra note 18, at 647 n.27, 658-59. Given that some of the historical and structural concerns about "trial by legislature" are that such trials might reflect overheated popular passions trials by mob -it would be odd indeed if the Clause did not apply directly to the legislative acts of the populace. Even more important, however, is that once judges find the rotten core of this law, they should throw the whole thing out as tainted.66 The unconstitutionality of naming some persons for disfavored treatment is visible in the very caption of Amendment 2. A statute that, say, used the word "nigger" should not be entitled to ordinary judicial deference. If the purpose of the Colorado electorate was so facially unconstitutional in so many of its words, the other words should fall too. The obvious animus of the part infects the whole.
IV.

In light of this line of analysis, we finally must consider two questions. First, is this really the Romer majority's theory? Second, if it is, what are the limiting principles of this theory, and how does it stand up to Justice Scalia's arguments in dissent?
We first turn to Justice Kennedy's majority opinion. It is short and sweet, with noble words and no footnotes. By moder standards, it is relatively free of formulaic doctrinal jargon.67 More than most opinions, it is written for fellow citizens, and avoids intricate jousting and pointed 62 Second, Justice Scalia suggests that the inequality imposedforcing gays and bis to win their rights statewide while heteros can win locally -is a justified reaction to queers' special clout as a "politically powerful minority."136 They are organized; they "reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities"; they "have high disposable income"; they "possess political power much greater than their numbers."'37 But much the same could be said -and in some times and places has been said -of Jews 
